The aim of this paper is to empirically investigate the relationship between FDI and domestic investment in a sample of 10 Central and Eastern European countries over the period . We find FDI to lead to a creative destruction phenomenon, with a short-term crowding out effect on domestic investment, followed by a long-term crowding in. Greenfield FDI develops stronger long run complementarities with domestic investment, while mergers and acquisitions do not show a significant effect on domestic investment. Financial development seems to mitigate crowding out pressures and even foster a crowding in for mergers and acquisitions. Keywords: investment, FDI, crowding-out, economic 
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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
As a capital flow, foreign direct investment (FDI) is often expected to act as a complement to domestic savings, thus facilitating the financing of local investment projects. While FDI can directly add to the existing capital stock, it can also indirectly influence the structure of the capital stock itself. Typically, local investors may react to FDI entry, leading to either a substitution or a complementary relationship. FDI crowds in (crowds out) domestic investors, when it leads to more (less) investment from domestic sources. The reaction of local investors to foreign firms' entry is of major interest for policy makers. If FDI is found to significantly crowd out domestic investment, its benefits for developing countries could be seriously challenged and policies designed to attract FDI could be put into question.
We can identify essentially two interaction channels between FDI and domestic investment. First, real market interaction occurs when FDI entry affects the demand addressed to local firms, either through a competition effect or through local sourcing. Second, the supply of funds associated with FDI may increase local liquidity and loosen financial constraints for domestic firms. We focus our analysis on the transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which have received considerable FDI inflows and have a particular stake in the capital accumulation issue. First, we depart from the traditional empirical framework used in previous studies by adopting a broader approach that includes additional determinants of investment. Second, we investigate the individual effects of greenfield FDI and mergers and acquisitions (M&A), as we expect potentially different implications for the dynamics of local investment. Third, we tackle the role of financial development in favoring a crowding in of domestic investment. Our results highlight a two stage impact of FDI on domestic investment, suggesting a creative destruction phenomenon. FDI crowds out domestic investors in the short term.
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iii As domestic firms progressively adjust and foreign affiliates develop trade linkages with local firms, the effect on domestic investment eventually becomes beneficial and tends towards a crowding in. The entry mode of foreign investors seems to matter for the impact of FDI on domestic investment. Our results suggest that greenfield FDI has a strong initial crowding out effect, while M&A have no immediate contribution to capital accumulation. Greenfield FDI appears prone to developing trade linkages within the local economy, therefore leading to a long-term crowding in effect on domestic investment. Instead, M&A, tributary to their financial nature, do not prove a consistent contribution to capital accumulation. Finally, we show that developed financial markets can partly compensate for the negative competition effect, due to their ability to effectively redistribute financial resources and thus facilitate access to finance for domestic investors. Conditional on developed financial markets, especially a strong banking sector, M&A can be conducive of a crowding in effect on domestic investment. The effect of greenfield FDI is less conditioned by financial development appears, as it main influence on domestic investment appears to channel through the real market. To the extent to which the short term crowding out phenomenon is the result of a competitive market mechanism, no strong policy measure is needed as the overall effect on national welfare should be positive. Some specific incentives to FDI entry may prove useful to mitigate the short run crowding out effect, like the preference for greenfield FDI, the entry of foreign investors in underdeveloped local industries or the use of local inputs. Public action to facilitate access to credit for local investors could also help alleviate some of the competition effects and allow a more balanced redistribution of financial resources. 
Les IDE ont-ils
Introduction
According to the neoclassical growth theory, economic growth is mostly driven by capital accumulation, up to the optimum level of capital stock per worker (Solow, 1956) While FDI can directly add to the existing capital stock, it can also influence the structure of the capital stock itself. Typically, local investors may react to FDI entry, leading to either a substitution or a complementary relationship (Agosin and Machado, 2005) . FDI crowds in (crowds out) domestic investors, when it leads to more (less) investment from domestic sources. Foreign investors may crowd out local investors due to increased competition, and thus deter previously planned investment projects (Markusen and Venables, 1999) . The crowding-out is more likely when foreign rivals are technologically sophisticated or if when domestic firms have limited absorptive capacity. Additionally, FDI may increase the demand addressed to local suppliers and thus have a crowding in effect on domestic investment (Cardoso and Dornbusch, 1989) . Finally, the supply of funds associated with FDI can increase local liquidity and loosen financial constraints for domestic firms (Harrison et al. 2004 ).
This paper investigates the contribution of FDI to capital accumulation in host countries, by focusing on its interaction with domestic investment. The reaction of local investors to foreign firms' entry is of major interest for policy makers. If FDI is found to significantly crowd out domestic investment, its benefits for developing countries could be seriously challenged and policies designed to attract FDI could be put into question. If crowding in is generally seen as beneficial, as it favors investment and overall economic growth, the implications of crowding out are yet ambiguous. While crowding out pushes less efficient domestic firms to exit the market, thus implying a negative short term effect on investment, it may also increase average productivity levels. This issue seems all the more important in Central and Eastern European 2 countries (CEEC), given the obsolete capital stock inherited from the socialist era and the industrial transformation that accompanied the transition period. In fact, as the initial distance to the world technological frontier was significant, there were opinions stating that the contribution of FDI to capital accumulation in CEE was more growth enhancing than the technology transfer associated with FDI (Hunya, 2000; Eichengreen, 2004).
Our contribution to the literature can be summarized as follows. First, we depart from the traditional empirical framework used in previous studies by adopting a broader approach that includes additional determinants of investment. Second, we investigate the individual effects of greenfield FDI and mergers and acquisitions (M&A), as we expect potentially different implications for the dynamics of local investment. Third, we built on the idea of a two nature interaction between FDI and domestic investment, through the real and the financial market.
We thus tackle the role of financial development in favoring a crowding in of domestic investment. This is, to the best of our knowledge, the first paper to provide some indication as to the relative importance of the two interaction channels, in the perspective of different types of FDI. Finally, we focus our analysis on CEEC, with a particular stake in the capital accumulation issue, analyzing the entire period after the fall of communism
Our results indicate that FDI has a two stage impact on domestic investment, tending towards a creative destruction phenomenon. In the short run, FDI crowds out domestic investment, while in the long run, it tends towards a crowding in, explained by the integration of foreign affiliates in the local market and the emergence of trade linkages. We find the interaction between greenfield FDI and domestic investment to mainly occur through a real market competition mechanism, while for M&A the interaction occurs essentially through the financial market. Greenfield FDI confirms the creative destruction pattern, with a stronger long run complementarity. Instead, M&A, tributary to their financial nature, do not prove a consistent contribution to capital accumulation. While real market competition seems to prevail in the relationship between foreign and local investors, financial development can mitigate part of the crowding out pressures. Conditional on strong banking sectors and developed capital markets, M&A can even be conducive of a crowding in effect on domestic investment.
In an attempt to shed some light on the issue of substitution/complementarity between foreign and domestic investment, our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 recalls the mechanisms of such an interaction and surveys the existing literature. Section 3 lays out the 3 empirical methodology and the dataset being used. The main results are then presented in section 4, followed by a discussion on the different entry modes of FDI in section 5. Section 6
investigates the role of financial development in fostering a crowding in effect of FDI on domestic investment. Finally, section 7 highlights the main conclusions.
Literature review
From the perspective of FDI as a capital flow, its effects on the host economy can mainly be found in capital accumulation 1 . The literature thus identifies two main interaction channels between FDI and domestic investment: one that takes place on the real market and a second one on the financial market (UNCTAD, 1999; Agosin and Machado, 2005).
The mechanism of real market interaction relies on the idea that FDI entry affects the demand addressed to local firms. As foreign affiliates often have lower marginal costs due to their specific advantage (Aitken and Harrison, 1999) , they capture a part of the domestic demand, forcing local firms to reduce output and thus raise their average cost. Increased competition may eventually lead them to abandon investment projects or even reduce existing production capacities. Sufficiently competitive local firms may still respond to FDI entry by increasing and updating their capital stock (De Mello, 1999) . To the extent that FDI uses local inputs, investment by domestic suppliers in upstream sectors can be stimulated as well (Cardoso and Dornbusch, 1989) . Finally, funds temporally released by cancelling previous investment projects could be directed to other activities where local firms have a comparative advantage.
A second interaction mechanism occurs on the financial market, where FDI may improve access to finance for domestic firms. As an international capital flow, FDI increases local liquidity, favors currency appreciation and interest rates decrease (Harrison et al., 2004) . If the effect seems more important in developing countries (Harrison et al., 2004) , its extent is thought to depend on the degree of financial market development (Razin et al. 1999 There is yet not consensus in the literature as to the effect of FDI on domestic investment. Overall, no clear consensus emerges from the literature regarding the effect of FDI on domestic investment. Additionally, the distinction between the different types of FDI seems to matter when investigating potential complementarities between domestic and foreign investment. Finally, none of the existing studies investigate the precise mechanisms of interaction between FDI and domestic investment, be it through the real economy or the financial spectrum. The aim of our paper is therefore to try to address these issues through an improved and detailed empirical analysis focused on CEEC. 
Methodology and data
Empirical methodology
The purpose of this section is to empirically estimate the effect of FDI on domestic capital accumulation. More precisely, we seek to find whether FDI crowds in or crowds out domestic investment. To this end, we estimate various specifications of an augmented investment function. We consider investment to be a partial adjustment process, between the existing and the desired capital stock, in the context of liquidity constraints and time adjustment constraints. As the investment rate is a structural component of the economy, we expect it to show a high persistence, corresponding to an autoregressive behavior.
Among the main determinants of investment, we include economic growth and the cost of capital. Thus, the inclusion of the lagged real GDP growth, as a proxy for the accelerator effect, is justified by expectations, adjustment and hysteresis phenomena in economic variables. Additionally, we include the real interest rate as a proxy for the cost of capital. We further consider several control variables including the terms of trade, as a proxy for the relative price of imported capital goods, and economic uncertainty. An increase in the terms of trade indicates relatively cheaper imports, with potentially positive effects on investment.
High economic uncertainty is expected to discourage investment, as anticipations of future profits are not well anchored. As a proxy for uncertainty, we consider the difference between the GDP forecast for the current year in the April World economic Outlook and the observed GDP growth at the end of the year. This measure is expected to capture unanticipated macroeconomic shocks 2 . We have tested several other measures of uncertainty, like the volatility of industrial production, the volatility of inflation, with little impact on investment.
As the abundance of liquidity may foster dynamic investment, we have tested several measures of liquidity, like the M2 monetary aggregate, its deviation from its three-year moving average, credit provided to the private sector. They proved insignificant in explaining investment, probably because their informational content is already included in the real interest rate. We have tested several other determinants of investment, which proved to be 2 One may argue that this proxy also captures forecast errors. While this may be the case, we argue that forecast errors occur when there is a considerable amount of uncertainty on the evolution of the macroeconomic aggregates. Second, as long as forecast errors are normally distributed and of zero mean, thus not biased in the positive or negative direction, this should not be problematic. Descriptive statistics in Table 6 in appendix show that this condition is broadly respected.
insignificant (trade, aggregate profitability, the relative price of capital goods, currency depreciation, public subsidies and the level of taxation). Finally, as our time span includes the great financial crisis, characterized by a major fall in investment in all countries, we include a crisis dummy variable, taking the value 1 for years 2009 and 2010 (compared to advanced countries, the crisis has been slighted delayed in transition and emerging countries).
Therefore, the empirical equation we will estimate is the following:
Where GFCF is gross fixed capital formation as a share of GDP, I is the real interest rate, G is real GDP growth rate, TT is the terms of trade, U stands for uncertainty, Crisis is a dummy variable for the economic crisis. ʋ i are country-specific fixed effects, and ε it is the error term, uncorrelated over time and across countries.
The choice of the dependent variable is not trivial. Here, we consider total investment, or gross fixed capital formation. GFCF represents a national accounts' aggregate, measuring net additions to fixed assets, and comprises both foreign and domestic investment As previously discussed, when using total investment as a dependent variable (instead of the domestic component of investment), a positive coefficient on FDI only shows that total investment increases with FDI. By consequence, it does not provide a sufficient indication as to the investment behavior of domestic firms. If crowding out were to take place, investment should grow less than the increase in FDI. Adversely, in the case of crowding in, the increase in investment should be higher than the increase in FDI. Therefore, when assessing the impact of FDI on domestic investment, our focus is on the β 3 coefficient associated with FDI in equation (2) . More than the sign, we are interested in the value of the coefficient : a crowding out effect would correspond to a β 3 coefficient less than 1, while a crowding in effect would correspond to a β 3 larger than 1. Nevertheless, our analysis is not spared by the limit that plagues all studies looking at the relationship between FDI and domestic investment, namely the difficulty if estimating the extent to which FDI inflows actually finance acquisition of fixed assets. Unfortunately, this shortcoming can only be addressed by micro level studies.
An alternative methodology would have been to proxy domestic investment by the residual of total investment when deducting FDI inflows. However, this residual measure is inaccurate as FDI inflows are not a true measure of investment by foreign firms. FDI is a financial flow stemming from the balance of payments. It actually includes any financial transfers from a 9 multinational's headquarters to its subsidiary, be it equity stakes, reinvested earnings and intra-company loans. The bias becomes all the more important as the share of M&A is large, as these flows are not captured in GFCF statistics. This has been the case in the 1990s, especially in developing countries embarking in massive privatization policies, as CEEC did.
Additionally, foreign affiliates can access other financing sources for their investment projects (loans, bonds), not captured in FDI statistics. Therefore, Morrissey and Udomkerdmongkol (2016) have argued that this alternative dependent variable may introduce a bias in favor of crowding out.
Additionally, the theoretical model of Markusen and Venables (1999) suggests a two stage impact of FDI on domestic investment: an initial crowding out, followed by a subsequent crowding in. In order to test this hypothesis, we compute long run elasticities of investment to FDI by using the dynamic nature of equation (2) and the convergence to the steady rate of investment. We assume that in the long run, the investment rate, which is a partial adjustment process, converges to its steady state equilibrium level, meaning that GFCF(t-1) = GFCF(t).
Thus, the marginal effect of FDI on GFCF 3 , assimilated to the long-run elasticity of investment to FDI, is given by the following expression:
As expression (3) is a nonlinear combination of parameter estimates from equation (2) , its significance can be tested through a non-linear Wald test (a standard Wald test for linearized constraint). We consider the nonlinear transformation in equation (3) 
Note: There is always the possibility for long-term elasticity to be null, and then the four hypothesis are reduced to only two, crowding out and crowding in.
The dynamic nature of equation (2) However, the countries in ours ample show a common pattern of economic development, so the aggregation bias should not be a concern. Moreover, we specifically consider financial heterogeneity as a factor potentially influencing the FDI-domestic investment nexus.
However, causality may run in both directions between FDI inflows and domestic investment.
A high domestic investment rate may signal profitability opportunities and favorable business with investment is shown in Table 7 in appendix. The difference in the Sargan/Hansen overidentification test, presented in Table 8 in appendix, allows us to discriminate between these external instruments. While both regional flows and financial openness as useful external instruments for FDI, we keep the former, as it is more efficient in eliminating endogeneity in equation (2).
Data
We focus our empirical analysis on the impact of FDI on domestic investment in Central and
Eastern Europe. The sample comprises 10 countries: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia. These countries, all members of the European Union, show a common institutional and cultural pattern. 
Results
Based on the described dataset and the empirical specification presented in the previous section, we present hereafter the main estimation results concerning the effect of FDI on domestic investment. Table 2 presents different specifications of equation (2).
Overall, the main determinants of investment are broadly significant and have the expected Economic growth appears to be a significant factor driving investment, with some exceptions. The inclusion of the crisis dummy variable seems to considerably diminish (columns 3 and 5), and even completely offset (columns 4 and 6), the importance of the accelerator mechanism. In fact, during crisis periods, it is not unusual for expectations about future economic prospects to be poorly anchored. Moreover, due to high economic uncertainty, economic agents lack confidence and are reluctant to engage in irreversible investment. Uncertainty clearly has a negative impact on investment decisions, whether we measure it by our favorite measure (the difference between the GDP growth forecast in April and the headline growth at the end of the year), or by the volatility of the monthly industrial production index. The terms of trade, while they are positive and significant in some specifications, do not seem to have a consistent influence on investment.
Focusing on the role of FDI, we first note a positive overall contribution to capital formation, as expected. We obtain a relatively stable coefficient, significant in all specifications, ranging between 0.218 -0.317. Therefore, a 1 pp of GDP increase in FDI inflows leads to an increase of the investment rate of slightly less than 0.3 pp. The values obtained are significantly smaller than 1, thus indicating that investment increases less than the increase in FDI inflows.
Following the methodological discussion in section 3.1, this corresponds to a short term crowding out effect on domestic investment. Increased competition due to foreign entry appears as the main factor explaining this phenomenon. Note: Estimates are made using GMM Arellano Bover. Standard errors are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** refers to the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels. The null hypothesis of the Arrelano Bond AR (2) test is no second order autocorrelation in the residuals. The Sargan test for validity of instruments has for null hypothesis the exogeneity of the instrument set.
Based on the coefficients presented in Table 2 , interpreted as the short term effects, we can compute long term elasticities, based on the methodology exposed in section 3.1. These elasticities are presented in the lower panel of (2) - (6), the coefficient of FDI is expected to decrease, so as its long-run elasticity. Actually, when controlling for uncertainty or the economic crisis in our estimations, the autoregressive term for the structural component of investment becomes higher, favoring a higher long term elasticity for FDI.
These elasticities suggest that the increase of investment is equal or higher than the increase in FDI inflows, indicating a long run crowding in effect. The initial crowding-out is found to decrease over time, with the integration of foreign affiliates within the host economy and the time needed for domestic firms to adjust and respond to competition. To a certain extent, local entrepreneurs, pushed to exit the market due to increased competitive pressures and weak institutional support, appear to be replaced after some years. Wang (2010) actually showed that the crowding out phenomenon is expected to disappear after an average of three years from FDI entry. In the long run, the emergence of linkages between foreign and local firms eventually leads to a beneficial effect for domestic investment. These results point to the validation of the second hypothesis in Table 1 Several robustness checks were performed. We considered the pre and post-crisis periods, as well as periods of economic boom, and we seek to find if the effect of FDI on domestic investment could differ depending on these specific contexts. Results are presented Table 9 in appendix. We first restrict the sample to the period 1995-2008 and then, we progressively introduce interactions between FDI and a post-crisis dummy, a boom dummy variable and economic growth. Overall, the same pattern seems to be observed, with a stronger crowding out pressure during the pre-crisis period. Additionally, FDI appears to be a more reliable source of financing for investment during economic downturns. This might be useful in order to complement domestic investment and foster economic recovery. Instead, during boom times (when GDP is above potential, or when economic growth is particularly strong), FDI provides less benefits for domestic investment. Finally, we have replaced total investment by private investment, with results presented in Table 10 in appendix. While we obtain similar results, the long run crowding in effect of FDI on private domestic investment appears more consistent.
Entry mode of FDI and impact on domestic investment. M&A versus greenfield FDI
The literature generally treats FDI as a homogeneous capital flow. However, different types of and re-run the estimations. This second set of results is presented in Table 3 , columns (1) - (4) for greenfield FDI and columns (5) - (8) for M&A.
The two components of FDI appear to have different effects on capital accumulation. On one hand, we note a positive and highly significant coefficient for greenfield FDI, as expected.
The coefficient is still smaller than 1, confirming short term crowding out. On the other hand, M&A seem to have a rather neutral short term impact on capital formation. M&A is poorly significant in column (5) and insignificant in all other estimations. These results seem consistent with the ones observed in the existing literature.
The long run elasticities presented in the lower panel of Table 3 give us some additional information as to the relationship between the entry mode of foreign investors and domestic investment. The elasticity of investment to greenfield FDI is significant and mainly higher than 1, confirming our previous results of long term crowding in. As for aggregate FDI, this conclusion is validated by non-linear Wald tests (even for column 2). When uncertainty and the crisis are taken into account, in column (4), a 1 pp of GDP increase in greenfield FDI leads to an increase in the investment rate of 1.223 pp in the long run. The long run elasticity is higher than for aggregate FDI, suggesting than greenfield FDI develops a stronger a complementary relationship with domestic investment in the long run. Estimates are made using GMM Arellano Bover. Standard errors are in brackets. *, **, and *** refers to the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels. The null hypothesis of the Arrelano Bond AR (2) test is the absence of second order autocorrelation in the residuals. The null of the Sargan test is the exogeneity of the instrument set.
Overall, greenfield FDI appears to confirm the creative destruction hypothesis. In a first stage, the entry of a new foreign firm squeezes the market share of existing domestic firms. This corroborates evidence of greenfield FDI becoming increasingly market oriented in CEEC during the 2000s, essentially in non-tradable sectors (see Figure 3) , thus incurring strong competitive pressures for domestic firms. In a second stage, its progressive integration into the local industrial network and the emergence of trade linkages creates additional demand, thus stimulating domestic investment, in the sense of a crowding in.
Adversely, we find M&A to have a neutral effect on investment. The takeover of an existing firm by a foreign investor does not significantly change market competition, as these companies operate within existing market shares. Moreover, as trade linkages are already into place, there is little scope for long-run benefits linked to the creation of new activities. If the post-acquisition period is sometimes devoted to productivity improvements, local firms have time to adjust and thus the risk of an adverse competition effect does not seem very strong. 
Financial development and the relationship between FDI and domestic investment
As stated in section 2, the interaction between FDI and domestic investors may occur on the real market or on the financial market. The policy implications of these two types of interactions are divergent. Therefore, identifying the mechanism by which FDI crowds out domestic investors appears essential for creating appropriate economic policies. In the case of real market crowding out, some local firms are displaced due to the higher efficiency of FDI.
However, the net impact on national wealth could be positive as the remaining firms are the most efficient ones, generating higher value added. Public intervention in this case should be limited to alleviating the potential risks related to the denationalization of certain industries and the creation of foreign enclaves (UNCTAD, 2000) . Adversely, if crowding out takes place on the financial market, increased demand for loans could result in higher interest rates and banks' preference for foreign companies could restrict access to finance for domestic firms. In this case, the net effect would be a decrease in national wealth, and public intervention would be needed, with measures to facilitate access to credit for local investors.
While our methodology does not allow us to directly investigate these issues, this is, to the best of our knowledge, the first study to try to give an indication as to the importance of the two interaction channels. As we cannot directly measure financial interaction, we argue that it should be all the more intense as local financial markets are developed (Razin et al. 1999 ).
We thus seek to isolate (part of) the financial market interaction by the use of interaction variables between FDI and different proxies for financial development. As described in section 3.1, we use four indicators of financial development from the EBRD: one for the banking sector, a second for the capital market, a third for the forex market and finally, a composite indicator. We create interaction variables between FDI and each of the four financial indicators, as proxies for the financial interaction between foreign and local investors. We refrain ourselves to interpret conditional coefficients (interaction coefficients) as financial interaction per se. Interaction variables thus only show the additional effect that FDI brings on domestic investment in the case of development financial markets. We interpret the independent coefficient for FDI as real market interaction. -0.064*** -0.062*** -0.063*** -0.064*** -0.064*** -0.065*** -0.066*** -0.067*** -0.080*** -0.077*** -0.078*** -0.075*** (0 Estimates are made using GMM Arellano Bover. Standard errors are in brackets. *, **, and *** refers to the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels. The null hypothesis of the Arrelano Bond AR (2) test is the absence of second order autocorrelation in the residuals. The Sargan test has the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the instrument set.
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The definition of crowding in/crowding out should take into account the sum the independent and the conditional coefficients for FDI. In this sense, financial development may mitigate/accentuate the short-term effect of FDI on domestic investment. Additionally, the computation of long run elasticities becomes quite complex when introducing interaction terms 6 . The relatively small sample and the number of coefficients involved lead to imprecise confidence intervals, not allowing us to properly test their significance. We thus prefer not to compute long run elasticities and discuss financial interaction only in the short term. The results of these estimates are found in Table 4 , columns (1)- (4) for total FDI, columns (2)- (8) for greenfield FDI and columns (9)- (12) for mergers and acquisitions. Given the different nature and scope of greenfield FDI and M&A, we expect this distinction to matter for the precise interaction mechanism with domestic investors. Since M&A are financial transactions only involving ownership transfer of existing assets, the potential for the funds to fuel local financial markets appears higher than for greenfield investment. As capital entering the country through M&A is not spent immediately (Razin et al.,1999) , the larger liquidity pool may foster a decrease in interest rates, thus facilitating access to finance for local entrepreneurs (Harrison et al., 2004) . Eren and Zhuang (2015) actually showed that a developed financial system complements the impact of M&A on economic growth in CEEC.
Adversely, in the case of greenfield FDI, a significant part of the invested capital is used for capital goods purchase. Depending on the source of these purchases (imports or the local market), the increase in the domestic capital supply would be reduced and the potential for financial interaction would be lower.
Results presented in Table 4 columns (5)- (12) Additionally, the interaction of M&A with financial market development appears very strong.
The coefficient for the interaction term in column (9) is quite high at 1.578. Despite no significant interaction trough the real market (the coefficient for M&A alone is still insignificant), developed financial markets foster a consistent complementary relationship between M&A and domestic investment, driving an overall crowding in effect. When looking at the different components of financial development, we note that it is the banking sector that drives the financial crowding in for M&A, followed by capital markets. Additionally, the coefficient for the interaction with capital markets is significantly higher for M&A than for greenfield FDI.
Finally, the interaction with the foreign exchange market is not significant in any of the regressions. This result appears to confirm previous work by Combes et al. (2011) , suggesting that the final effect of FDI on the foreign exchange market tends to be neutral 7 , as FDI is often used to finance imports, thus offsetting potential appreciation pressures.
These results seem to suggest that the interaction between greenfield FDI and domestic investment essentially occurs through a competition effect on the real market, giving rise to short term crowding out pressures. Adversely, real market interaction does not appear very strong for M&A, for which most of the interaction with domestic investment occurs through the financial market, potentially leading to a crowding in effect. Overall, it appears that negative real market competition effect prevails in the relationship between foreign and local Estonia, appear to benefit from a higher contribution of FDI to capital formation.
Conclusions
When looking at the relationship between FDI and domestic investment, theoretical studies suggest that FDI may crowd out domestic investment in the short term, while leading to a long-run complementarity. In order to test this hypothesis, we extend the empirical framework Finally, we investigated to what extent does financial development influence the interaction between foreign and local investors. Our results confirm that developed financial markets partly compensate for the negative competition effect, due to their ability to effectively redistribute financial resources and thus facilitate access to finance for domestic investors.
Conditional on developed financial markets, especially a strong banking sector, M&A can be conducive of a crowding-in effect on domestic investment. The effect of greenfield FDI is less conditioned by financial development appears, as it main influence on domestic investment appears to channel through the real market.
To the extent to which the short term crowding out phenomenon is the result of a competitive market mechanism, with the most productive firms remaining on the market, no strong policy measure should be needed as the overall effect on national welfare should be positive. Still, caution is needed as local firms exiting the market may cause unemployment and there is always the risk of a denationalization of some industries. Consequently, specific incentives to FDI entry may prove useful to mitigate the short run crowding-out effect. Greenfield investment may be preferred to M&A as it appears to be beneficial for domestic investment in the long run. The entry of foreign investors in underdeveloped local industries could be encouraged, while the incentives to use local inputs could favor the emergence of trade linkages within the host economy and thus benefit investment. Governments could also use fiscal levers in order to stimulate reinvestment of capital resources released by the cessation of activities. Finally, public action should facilitate access to credit for local investors, thus helping to alleviate some of the competition effects and allowing a more balanced redistribution of financial resources.
APPENDIX Figure 1. Greenfield FDI versus M&A (1990-2010)
Source: UNCTAD, WIR 2016 (FDI). M&A refer to cross-border mergers and acquisitions, as reported by the country of the seller. Greenfield is the difference between total FDI net inflows and net M&A flows. Volatility of IPI The volatility of the industrial production, computed as the standard deviation of the monthly industrial production, divided by the average industrial production for the year. 
UNCTAD
Volatility of REER
The volatility of the real effective exchange rate, computed as the standard error of the monthly REER divided by the average REER for each year.
Authors, based on BIS data
Regional capital flows
The sum of total capital flows (FDI, portfolio and banking flows) to the 10 countries in the sample, divided by the total GDP of the sample. 
Note:
Tests are based on a baseline dynamic regression of GFCF including lagged growth, the interest rate and FDI as explanatory variables. FDI is endogenous and recursively instrumented with each of the considered external instruments. The difference in the Sargan/Hansen test computes the increase in the Hansen J statistics when the given subset of instruments is added to the estimation. Under the null of joint validity of all instruments, the change in J is χ2 with degrees of freedom equal to the number of added instruments. Note: Estimates are made using GMM Arellano Bover. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** refers to the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels. The null hypothesis of the Arrelano Bond AR (2) test is the absence of second order autocorrelation in the residuals. The Sargan test for validity of instruments has the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the instrument set. Note: Estimates are made using GMM Arellano Bover. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** refers to the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels. The null hypothesis of the Arrelano Bond AR (2) test is the absence of second order autocorrelation in the residuals. The Sargan test for validity of instruments has the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the instrument set.
